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Abstract
The doomsday argument is a probabilistic argument that claims
to predict the total lifetime of the human race. By examining the case
of an individual lifetime, I conclude that the argument is fundamen-
tally related to consciousness. I derive a reformulation stating that an
infinite conscious lifetime is not possible even in principle. By consid-
ering a hypothetical conscious computer, running a non-terminating
program, I deduce that consciousness cannot be generated by a single
set of deterministic laws. Instead, I hypothesize that consciousness is
generated by a superposition of brain states that is simultaneously as-
sociated with many quasi-classical histories, each following a different
set of deterministic laws. I generalize the doomsday argument and
discover that it makes no prediction in this case. Thus I conclude
that the very fact of our consciousness provides us with evidence for
a many-worlds interpretation of reality in which our future is not pre-
dictable using anthropic reasoning.
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1 Background
[Einstein] told us once: ‘Life is finite. Time is infinite. The
probability that I am alive today is zero. In spite of this, I am
now alive. Now how is that?’ None of his students had an answer.
After a pause, Einstein said, ‘Well, after the fact, one should not
ask for probabilities.’[1]
In the above quote Einstein presages a currently much-debated applica-
tion of anthropic reasoning called the doomsday argument. The argument
itself was first conceived by Brandon Carter in the early 1980s and subse-
quently published by John Leslie[2, 3, 4, 5] and Richard Gott[6, 7]. In essence
one imagines a chronologically ordered list of all the human beings who will
ever live and then asks where one expects to be along that list. Now the ar-
gument goes that, a priori, one should expect to be a “non-special” member
of the human race. Thus, in terms of one’s position in the list, one should
not expect to be among those few humans at the beginning or end, but
rather with the majority around the middle of the list. This is basically an
application of the “Copernican principle”[6] to our temporal position along
the lifetime of the human race. Given this assumption, and an estimate of
one’s position from the beginning of the list, one can use the argument to
predict the total number of humans who will ever be born. By estimating
how long it will take for the extra births to occur, it is then possible to make
a prediction of the total lifetime of the human race.
Now the above argument depends crucially on an application of the “prin-
ciple of indifference” to one’s position within the human race. Let us imagine
a list of arbitrary labels representing every human who will ever live, in order
of birth date. One could state that the principle of indifference immediately
implies that one’s label is equally likely to be located at any position within
that list. This assumption has been criticized by Korb & Oliver[8] and more
recently by Sowers[9]. These authors believe that only some random sam-
pling procedure (like picking balls from an urn) could ensure such a uniform
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probability distribution. However I contend that this criticism is based on
an incorrect application of the principle of indifference. Instead, given such a
list, the principle implies that one is equally likely to be represented by any of
the labels in that list. The uniform probability distribution for one’s location
then follows from the fact that each label has a unique position associated
with it. In Section 4, I derive this principle of indifference distribution by
reasoning about the ensemble of humans who might find themselves at any
given position within the human race.
It is the premise of this paper that the chink in the doomsday predic-
tion’s armour resides not in the uniform likelihood for one’s position per se
but rather in its extension to the case of an unending human race. As pointed
out in the above quote, it is impossible to extend a uniform probability dis-
tribution over an infinite ensemble of possibilities. If one attempts to do
so one obtains the nonsense answer that there is a zero prior probability of
finding oneself at any given position within the human race. Now although
one might question whether an unending human race is physically possible
one must surely concede that it is at least logically possible. Thus I believe
that any valid doomsday-type reasoning must be able to handle the case of
an infinite ensemble of human beings without leading to absurdity. It has
been argued (Leslie, Bostrom private communications) that a uniform prob-
ability distribution can be applied to the limiting case of an infinite human
race by assuming an infinitesimal probability of finding oneself at any posi-
tion within such an ensemble. This is, however, mathematically untenable
because infinitesimal probabilities can only be defined over continuous sets
whereas the set of human beings is discrete.
Thus we are left with the problem of how to apply a uniform prior prob-
ability distribution for our birth position to the case of an infinite human
race. Now one approach, following Einstein, is to assert that because we
already know our position in the human race we can no longer reason about
the prior probability that we should have found ourselves at that position.
A similar point was made by Dyson[10] in his review of Leslie’s book The
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End of the World. To me this statement seems to deny the possibility of any
type of Bayesian reasoning at all. Following Rev. Bayes’s prescription one’s
prior probabilities should be updated to posterior probabilities conditional
on learning any new piece of data. The applicability of this rule surely does
not depend on the time at which it is applied. The fact that one is not around
to formulate prior probabilities before one is born surely does not preclude
one from formulating such probabilities after one’s birth and then condition-
alizing this knowledge with one’s measured position within the human race.
An instructive way of approaching this problem is to ask how much informa-
tion one gains on finding one’s birth position within the human race. Now it
seems an undeniable fact that one does gain a certain amount of information
on measuring one’s birth position n. Given that the amount of information
gained depends on one’s prior probability for the value of n, this implies that
prior probabilities for one’s birth position must exist even though one was
not around to reason about them before one’s birth.
2 Introduction
In this paper I investigate the doomsday argument in terms of information
in an attempt to understand how the reasoning used in the case of a finite
ensemble can be carried over to the problematic infinite case. I start, in
Section 3, by deriving the doomsday prediction for a finite population size.
In doing so I note an important difference between Leslie’s and Gott’s for-
mulation of the argument. In Leslie’s formulation the prior probability is
left unspecified so that the doomsday argument is seen to consist solely of
the change in one’s beliefs on learning of one’s position in the human race.
In Gott’s formulation[7], however, a specific prior is used that represents our
complete prior ignorance of the total lifetime of the human race. I argue that
Leslie’s formulation fails due to a reason first suggested by Dieks[11], and fur-
ther developed by Kopf, Krtous and Page[12], Bartha and Hitchcock[13] and
in particular Olum[14]. The problem is that if one uses any prior, other than
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the “vague” prior suggested by Gott, one finds that the doomsday shift in
probabilities is cancelled out by the effect of the increased likelihood of being
born in a large population.
Having derived the doomsday prediction in terms of the human race, I
apply doomsday reasoning to the lifetime of a single conscious observer. This
might seem like a rather bold abstraction but I believe that the situation is
entirely analogous to that of the human race and brings out the previously
under-reported role that conscious awareness plays in the doomsday argu-
ment. The only difference between the classic doomsday scenario and the
application of doomsday reasoning to the lifetime of an observer is that in
the former case one imagines a chronologically ordered list of human be-
ings whereas in the latter case one pictures a sequence of the observer’s
“moments” of consciousness (see Bostrom[15] for the related proposal of
“observer-moments”). Following Gott, we regard the doomsday argument
as ab initio reasoning so that we ignore any prior statistical information we
have about the lifetimes of actual human observers.
In Section 4, I argue that, on consciously “finding” himself in his current
moment, the observer gains information about the ensemble of conscious mo-
ments that make up his lifetime. Now I realize that the term “consciousness”
can be defined in a number of ways. In this paper the term refers solely to
the basic act of awareness of something. By actually having some determi-
nate experience an event takes place that can be labelled with a unique time.
I contend that the associated perception of “now”, the current moment, is
a fundamental aspect of consciousness shared by all conscious beings. By
demonstrating that the amount of information that an observer gains on
finding himself in his current moment does not depend on the location of
that moment, I derive the principle of indifference result that, a priori, one
is equally likely to be in any moment along one’s lifetime. In Section 5, I
attempt to apply this reasoning to the case of an infinite lifetime. I find that,
on the one hand, in discovering his current moment out of an infinite ensem-
ble of moments, the observer should gain an infinite amount of information.
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But, on the other hand, I argue that such a state of affairs is not logically
possible. Thus I conclude that an infinite conscious lifetime is not possible
in principle.
Now, in Section 6, I argue that this result has profound implications. I
consider the hypothetical case of a classical computer that, by running a
particular program, experiences conscious awareness as a “by-product” of
its operation. Now by the doomsday result above such a program must
only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. But I argue that
if a program exists that allows a computer to generate a finite sequence
of conscious moments then there seems no reason why the same program
cannot be modified to generate an infinite sequence of moments. I conclude
that the only way out of this impasse is to deny that a classical computer
can experience consciousness in the first place. This statement is equivalent
to asserting that consciousness cannot be generated by a set of deterministic
laws. Now, given that we ourselves are conscious, this result implies that our
brains must operate, at least partly, in a non-deterministic manner.
In an effort to understand this non-determinism further I postulate that
it is equivalent to asserting that conscious awareness is generated by many
different sets of deterministic laws operating simultaneously. In Section 7,
I argue that such a conception of reality is implied by the many-worlds in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics in which time is no longer linear but
instead has a branching structure. In Section 8, I hypothesize that in order
to modify the doomsday argument to accommodate this scenario one simply
needs to lift the assumption, implicit in the Bayesian probability calculation,
that the observer’s present moment is associated with only one future with
some definite total number of conscious moments. By assuming instead that
the present moment is associated with an ensemble of many actually occur-
ring futures, weighted by Gott’s prior function, I find that the doomsday
argument fails to make any prediction about which future the observer will
experience. Thus I conclude that the very fact of our consciousness can only
be explained within a many-worlds ontology. Moreover, when the doomsday
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argument is generalized to take such a view of reality into account, it fails to
make any predictions about the future.
3 The Doomsday Prediction
As conventionally applied, the doomsday argument purports to predict the
total size of the human race, N, given one’s birth position, n, within it. In
doing so one implicitly makes the assumption that one’s present position is
associated with one unknown, but finite, future total population size. One
first imagines a finite chronologically ordered list of labels representing all the
humans who will ever be born. Next one argues that, a priori, one is equally
likely to be represented by any one of those labels. Now, as pointed out in
Section 2, this is an application of the principle of indifference. I show in the
next section that this crucial assumption can be derived by reasoning about
the symmetry properties of the probability of finding oneself at any given
position. One proceeds by considering an ensemble of N hypotheses, each
one specifying that a different human is located at that position. The fact
that all the hypotheses are completely equivalent implies that each should
be assigned the same prior probability. Thus the prior likelihood that one
should find oneself at any position n, given that there will be a total of N
humans altogether, P (n | N), is 1/N . Now this derivation of the principle
of indifference suggests that it is in the act of consciously perceiving one’s
present moment that one gains information rather than from learning one’s
birth position per se. Even before learning of one’s birth position, one can
argue that the very fact that one is alive at this particular time differentiates
one, in principle, from all the other humans. The prior likelihood of this
event, regardless of one’s birth position, is 1/N . Thus, as mentioned in
the previous section, the doomsday argument is intimately linked with the
phenomenon of conscious awareness.
Now the doomsday argument uses Bayesian probability theory to provide
its prediction of the total population size, N, given one’s birth position n. One
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considers a set of exclusive hypotheses for N and then calculates how one’s
prior probabilities for these hypotheses change on learning one’s position n.
Let us start our derivation of the doomsday prediction by considering two
equivalent expressions for the combined probability of n and N, P (n ∧ N),
given by
P (n ∧N) = P (N | n) P (n) = P (n | N) P (N).
This expression can be rearranged to give Bayes’s theorem
P (N | n) =
P (n | N) P (N)
P (n)
,
where P (N | n) is the posterior probability of a total population size N given
that one finds oneself born at position n, P (n | N) is the likelihood of finding
oneself at position n given a total population size N, and P (n), P (N) are
the prior probabilities of n and N respectively. We have shown already that
P (n | N), the likelihood of finding oneself at birth position n given that there
will be N births altogether, is given by the principle of indifference so that
we have
P (n | N) =
1
N
.
In order to use Bayes’s theorem to calculate P (N | n), the posterior
probability of a total population size N, given our birth position n, we also
need some prior probability distribution for N, P (N). Now, as noted in
Section 2, a number of authors, such as Leslie[5] and Bostrom[16], regard the
doomsday argument as depending solely on the shift of probabilities induced
by the likelihood P (n | N) = 1/N regardless of the form of the prior P (N).
This position has been shown to be untenable by a number of other authors,
most recently Olum[14]. He reasoned that the data inherent in finding oneself
at some position within the human race comprises not simply the information
that you are located at that position but also that you were actually born in
the first place. Thus the likelihood that one should use in Bayes’s theorem
is P (n ∧ B | N), the probability of both finding oneself born and located at
position n within a population of size N, given by
P (n ∧ B | N) = P (n | B,N) P (B | N),
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where P (B | N) is the probability of being born anywhere in a population
of size N and P (n | B,N) is the probability of finding oneself at position
n given that one has been born into a population of size N. By assuming
that P (n ∧ B | N) = P (n | N), Leslie and Bostrom make the implicit prior
assumption that one is certain to be born somewhere within the population.
Let us see the effect of lifting this restriction. We start by assuming any
normalizable prior for N, P (N). Given such a prior P (N) there must exist
some length scale L such that the probability that N is less than L, P (N < L),
is larger than any given confidence limit. On the assumption of a set of all
possible humans, of size L, one can argue that the probability, P (B | N), of
being a member of the subset of actual humans, of size N, is given by
P (B | N) =
N
L
.
Thus the larger the population size the more chance one has of being born.
When one combines this result with the principle of indifference expression
for the original doomsday likelihood, P (n | B,N) = 1/N , one finds that
P (n ∧B | N) =
1
N
·
N
L
.
The two contributions to the overall likelihood of being born at position n
cancel each other out. Thus as soon as one considers any particular nor-
malizable prior P (N) the doomsday shift in one’s posterior for N given n,
P (N | n), disappears.
Olum argued that this fact demolishes the doomsday argument but in fact
there is one prior that is immune to the above reasoning. This prior is the
so-called vague prior P (N) = 1/N , first described by Jeffreys[17], which has
been extensively used to represent complete prior ignorance of a scale vari-
able (e.g. Hesselbo and Stinchcombe[18]). In order to sketch a justification
for this prior we note that, according to algorithmic information theory[19],
the intrinsic probability of any binary string is defined by the smallest pro-
gram that will generate that string. Now the size of such a program must be
less than the length of the string itself. Thus the program required to specify
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the binary representation of N must be less than approximately log
2
N bits
in length. This implies that the intrinsic probability of N, P (N), must be
greater than 1/N . Thus the vague prior is not so much a probability dis-
tribution but rather a “template” for a distribution. Now, as this prior is
scaleless (it is invariant under a change of scale) and non-normalizable, no
scale L exists that allows one to argue that P (B | N) = N/L. This implies
that one cannot argue that the probability of being born is proportional to
the size of the population and so consequently there is no factor of N to
cancel out the principle of indifference term P (n | B,N) = 1/N .
Gott’s Bayesian formulation[7] of the doomsday argument survives
Olum’s attack because it implicitly assumes that we have no prior knowledge
about N so that we should represent our knowledge with the vague prior. Let
us return to our original Bayesian formulation for the posterior for N given
n, P (N | n), given by
P (N | n) =
P (n | N) P (N)
P (n)
.
Assuming the vague priors P (N) = 1/N and P (n) = 1/n, together with the
doomsday likelihood P (n | N) = 1/N , we find that
P (N | n) =
n
N2
.
This posterior is a perfectly proper probability distribution and represents
real knowledge about N even though we started with a prior that was not
normalizable. By integrating the above expression one can calculate the
probability that N is less than some limit M, P (N < M), as
P (N < M) = 1−
n
M
.
By substituting M = 10n in the above expression, one derives a standard
doomsday prediction to the effect that there is a 90% probability that the
total size of the human race, N, will be less than ten times the number of
humans who have been born so far.
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4 Derivation of the Principle of Indifference
As mentioned in the previous section, the doomsday argument relies crucially
on the principle of indifference applied to one’s position within the human
race. This implies that, given a finite list of all the humans who will ever
live, and assuming no other prior knowledge, one assumes that one is equally
likely to be anywhere within that list. As described previously, the principle
of indifference can be derived by considering the ensemble of humans who
could “find” themselves at a given position within the list. I contend that,
in the very act of consciously perceiving “now”, one gains information about
the ensemble of human beings. In this section we use symmetry principles
and an information theory approach to derive the principle of indifference in
the context of a single conscious observer.
Let us assume that the observer is equipped with a clock and that his
conscious experience lasts for N intervals of time. We term each interval of
consciousness a “moment” so that the observer’s awareness is discretized into
a time-ordered sequence of N conscious moments. One starts by considering
the amount of information that the observer gains on finding himself in his
current conscious moment. The amount of information he gains depends on
his initial knowledge of the situation. We assume that his prior knowledge
consists solely of the assumption that he will experience a total of N conscious
moments altogether. Let us suppose that, while in his current conscious
moment, and before he has noted the time, the observer considers some
particular time interval n. He reasons that either his current moment is
located in interval n or one of the other conscious moments is located in that
interval. As the observer knows nothing more about these N possibilities,
I assert that his prior knowledge must simply be represented by a list of N
arbitrary labels, each one representing a conscious moment that might be
located in interval n.
Now the observer considers the conscious moment that is actually located
in interval n. He assigns p1 and p2 to be the probabilities that the label C,
representing this moment, is in the first and second half of the list respec-
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tively. Let us assume that the observer swaps the two halves of the list over.
He assigns p∗
1
and p∗
2
be the probabilities that the label C is in the first and
second half of the resulting list. This second list of labels represents the
observer’s initial knowledge just as adequately as the first one. The prior
probabilities for the position of label C depend entirely on the observer’s
initial knowledge which in turn is represented by an arbitrarily ordered list
of labels. As a transposition of an arbitrary list is also an arbitrary list then
both represent the same knowledge which in turn implies that the two sets
of probabilities must be identical so that we have
p∗
1
= p1 and p
∗
2
= p2.
Now the observer also knows that the probability that label C is in a set of
labels should “travel” with that set of labels in the transposition operation.
Thus in order to maintain consistency between the two sets of probabilities
it must also be the case that
p∗
1
= p2 and p
∗
2
= p1.
Combining these two sets of equations we find that
p∗
1
= p∗
2
and p1 = p2.
Thus the observer must assign equal prior probabilities to label C being
in either half of an arbitrary list of labels. This implies that, on learning in
which half of an arbitrary list label C resides, the observer gains precisely
one bit of information. Now this reasoning can be applied again to a list
comprising the half of the original list that contained label C. The observer
will again assign equal probabilities to label C being in either half of this new
list. On learning which half contains label C the observer will gain another
bit of information. In general, starting with an arbitrarily ordered list of
N labels, this process must be repeated log
2
N times in order to specify a
particular label uniquely.
Now let us suppose that, on consulting the clock, the observer finds that
his current conscious moment is actually located in time interval n. This
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is equivalent to his current moment being specified uniquely from amongst
an arbitrarily ordered ensemble of N conscious moments that could have
found themselves in interval n. Thus, in finding himself in interval n, the
observer gains log
2
N bits of information. As each bit is equivalent to a
probability factor of 1/2, this implies that P (n | N), the prior probability
that the observer finds himself in any interval n conditional on there being
N conscious moments altogether, is given by
P (n | N) =
1
N
.
This is the well-known principle of indifference but here it has been derived
in a rigorous manner following the symmetry arguments of Jaynes[20].
5 The Infinite Lifetime Paradox
Now, as mentioned in Section 3, in following the doomsday argument one
makes the implicit assumption that the human race will be finite in size.
Accordingly, in the previous section, we derived the principle of indifference
by considering the case of a single observer experiencing a finite conscious
lifetime. We now wish to examine the case in which the observer experiences
a countable infinity of conscious moments. Although this scenario might
seem physically infeasible there is no reason why we should not consider it in
principle. In fact, as pointed out in Section 1, as soon as one tries to apply
the principle of indifference to such a case one comes up against the problem
of extending a uniform probability distribution over an infinite ensemble of
possibilities.
In order to investigate this problem further we shall attempt to extend
the reasoning we used in the previous section to the case of an infinite con-
scious lifetime. As in the case of a finite lifetime, let us consider the ensemble
of conscious moments that might be located in the time interval n. Again,
as the observer knows nothing more about these moments he can only rep-
resent them by an infinite set of arbitrary labels. Now in the case of the
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finite ensemble, as described in the previous section, the observer considered
the labels arranged in an ordered list. This situation implies a one-to-one
mapping between each label and each integer from 1 to N. In order to reason
about an infinite ensemble we shall assume instead that the observer’s initial
knowledge is represented by an arbitrary one-to-one mapping between each
label and each rational number in the interval (0, 1]. This is feasible because
such rational numbers form a countably infinite set.
Now, as before, the observer considers the conscious moment that is actu-
ally located in interval n. The label C, representing this moment, is mapped
to a rational number in either the first or second half of the interval (0, 1].
As in the case of the finite list of labels we can imagine a transposition of the
mapping such that all labels that were mapped to rationals in (0, 1/2] are
now mapped to rationals in (1/2, 1] and vice-versa. Again both mappings
represent the observer’s initial knowledge equally well so that he should use
the same probability distribution for the position of label C under both map-
pings. Combining the need for consistency between the probability distribu-
tions with the above symmetry requirement leads the observer to reason that
label C is equally likely to be mapped to either half of the interval (0, 1]. This
again implies that, on learning to which half of the interval (0, 1] label C is
mapped, the observer gains one bit of information. As in the finite case, the
above reasoning can be reapplied to the half of the interval that contains the
rational number mapped to label C. On learning in which half of this new
interval label C resides the observer gains another bit of information. Now
one can see that in contrast to the case of a finite list the above process does
not terminate.
Let us assume that the observer actually does find himself in some finite
time interval n given the assumption that an infinite ensemble of conscious
moments will eventually exist, any one of which might have been located in
that time interval. As argued above, this situation is equivalent to indicating
a rational number in the interval (0, 1] by specifying whether the number is
in the first or second half of a sequence of successively smaller intervals. The
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amount of information that the observer would gain from his perception of
his current moment, in such circumstances, must be larger than any finite
number of bits. This seems to imply that, in the act of finding himself at
some point within an infinite conscious lifetime, the observer gains an infinite
number of bits of information.
This situation seems reminiscent of one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion in
which a runner travelling from A to B has first to cover half the distance
between the two points. But in order to cover this half-distance he has to
first travel half of the half-distance and so on. Zeno’s problem is generally
not regarded as a paradox nowadays because it is known that an infinite sum
of exponentially decreasing lengths does actually converge to a finite dis-
tance. However it is my contention that one does run into a paradox when
one considers the observer’s perception of his current moment of conscious-
ness within an infinite ensemble of such moments. As shown earlier such
a moment would require an infinite-sized bitstring to specify it from within
the countably infinite set of conscious moments. The paradox arises because
there are in fact infinitely more infinite-sized binary strings than there are
countable conscious moments.
One can see that the set of infinite-sized binary strings is at least larger
than any countable set by using Cantor’s diagonal slash argument. This
involves first assuming the contrary position, namely that it is possible to
uniquely assign each infinite-sized binary string to each successive integer.
Now given such a list of binary strings it is possible to construct a new binary
string that differs from the first string in the first binary digit, the second
string in the second binary digit and so on. This new binary string cannot
be anywhere in the original list and so we have shown that there is at least
one more infinite-sized binary string than there are integers. Now this is a
problem because in order for the binary strings to be interpreted as bitstrings
(i.e. strings of characters representing equally likely binary events) there
must be a strict one-to-one correspondence between each string and each
countable conscious moment. Thus we are left with a contradiction. On the
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one hand we have shown that, on finding himself in some time interval n, the
observer must gain an amount of information larger than any finite number
of bits; this implies a countable infinity of bits. On the other hand we can see
that the set of infinite-sized binary strings is too large for them to represent
bitstrings over the countable set of conscious moments.
Now one could take this result at face value and declare that it simply
implies that, on the assumption of an infinite lifetime, no prior probability as-
signment exists for the event of finding oneself at a particular position within
that lifetime. But, as we have demonstrated above, one can at least argue for
a succession of increasing lower bounds to the amount of information gained
from such an event. Due to the inverse relationship between information and
probability this result translates into a sequence of decreasing upper bounds
for the prior probability. Thus, on finding oneself at some position within
an infinite lifetime, one can argue that one’s prior probability for this event
is less than any given value which implies that it must have some non-zero
numerical assignment. Paradoxically, also as shown above, such a probability
assignment cannot exist. I contend that the only way to avoid this dilemma
is to deny that an infinite ensemble of conscious moments is possible even in
principle.
6 The Hypothetical Conscious Computer
Now this result has fundamental implications for the theory of mind. Let us
imagine that our conscious observer is a classical system operating according
to a set of deterministic laws. It has been conjectured[21] that the behaviour
of such a system can always be simulated by a classical computer executing
some finite-sized program. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume
that our observer is a classical computer that, by virtue of executing a par-
ticular program, generates a sequence of conscious moments. It should be
noted that, strictly, we are taking an “epiphenomenal” philosophical stance
in that we assume that the computer’s conscious awareness is a continuously
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generated by-product that does not interfere with its deterministic operation.
As the computer’s behaviour is completely determined by its program, we
have two scenarios: either the program generates a finite number of conscious
moments or it produces an infinite number.
Now, as demonstrated in the previous section, the scenario of an infinite
conscious lifetime leads to paradox. Thus, on the assumption that a computer
experiences conscious awareness, this result implies that its program must
only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. But we know that this
conclusion is absurd. We can always imagine a simple modification to the
program so that, after generating its finite sequence of conscious moments,
it resets the computer’s memory and re-executes itself. It seems clear that if
the original program generates conscious awareness then the modified version
should also generate a sequence of conscious moments comprising the original
finite sequence endlessly repeating. Now one could argue that as such a
repeating sequence only consists of a finite number of subjectively distinct
moments then one still has a finite-sized ensemble of possibilities. In fact as
the computer is a physical machine that dissipates energy with time then,
according to the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of the system
comprising the computer and its environment should continually increase.
As each conscious moment is then associated with a different configuration
of the system as a whole then each one is, in principle, unique. Thus we again
run into the infinite lifetime paradox. If the computer, while running such
a program, finds itself in any given time interval then its current conscious
moment is specified from within an infinite ensemble of unique moments that
could have occupied that time interval. Again a contradiction arises in that
the computer would gain an amount of information that, while larger than
any finite number, cannot consistently be assigned an infinite value.
It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can
generate conscious awareness in the first place. This assertion is equivalent
to stating that the phenomenon of consciousness cannot be fully described by
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any set of deterministic laws. Now we know, of course, that we are conscious
(Descartes and all that!). Thus we arrive at the conclusion that our brains
cannot operate purely on the basis of a set of deterministic laws. How can
one understand this “non-deterministic” nature of consciousness further?
7 Chaotic Observers and Consistent Histo-
ries
I propose that in order to understand consciousness we need to consider a
quantum-mechanical view of reality in which the instantaneous state of the
brain is described by a superposition whose subsequent behaviour is repre-
sented by many sets of deterministic laws. This scenario can be understood
in terms of the consistent histories approach[22, 23] to quantum theory, in
which, through interaction with the rest of the Universe, the evolving wave
function of a system continually decoheres into a mixture of quasi-classical
histories. Now, in general, one can describe the state of a physical system by
using a multi-dimensional configuration space in which each point represents
the spatial positions of all the particles that make up the system. In classical
physics the instantaneous state of a system is described by one point in con-
figuration space. The time evolution of such a system is then represented by
a single curve or history through that point, the shape of which is governed
by deterministic laws comprising the classic “laws of physics” together with
their “initial conditions”.
In contrast, the instantaneous state of a quantum system is described by
a complex-valued wave function that can extend over the whole of configu-
ration space. The wave function of an isolated quantum system then evolves
as a coherent whole following the rules of quantum dynamics. Now this be-
haviour is altered if the quantum system interacts with its environment. In
this case the wave function quickly loses its long- range phase coherence so
that it evolves into a mixture of wave packets that are localized around each
point in configuration space[24]. As each of these wave packets is localized in
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configuration space then, due to the uncertainty principle, each must be de-
localized in momentum space. Thus there is a tendency for each wave packet
to spread out coherently before being broken up again into decoherent parts
by interaction with the environment. In general, the time evolution of such
a system takes the form of an overlapping continuum of constantly ramify-
ing histories through configuration space, each one following approximately
classical dynamics.
Now it has been pointed out by Stapp[25] that attempts to explain, en-
tirely within quantum theory, the single quasi-classical history experienced
by an observer have so far foundered on the “preferred basis problem”. In
order that quantum theory can provide a probabilistic prediction for which
quasi-classical history an observer experiences one requires a discrete set of
orthogonal quasi-classical histories that span the space of all such histories.
In this section I propose that the divergent quasi-classical histories of certain
chaotic systems might fulfil these requirements. Thus I am led to the tenta-
tive conclusion that human beings are conscious observers by virtue of the
chaotic functioning of their brains (I’m tempted to say that I arrived at this
hypothesis through introspection!).
In order to understand the special qualities of chaotic systems it is neces-
sary first to review the behaviour of non-chaotic ones. Therefore let us con-
sider that archetypal regular classical system, the clockwork mechanism. As
mentioned before, the time evolution of such a classical system is described by
a single history through configuration space. Now, in reality, Nature follows
the rules of quantum mechanics. Thus even a clockwork mechanism should,
in principle, be represented by a wave function in configuration space. If we
assume that the mechanism interacts with the environment then its wave
function will decohere into an overlapping mixture of localized wave pack-
ets. Each wave packet describes a superposition of clockwork mechanisms,
whose components differ slightly in position, orientation and detailed struc-
ture. Now we assume that the mechanism is rigidly constructed so that any
configuration in which its structure is significantly distorted has a high poten-
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tial energy. As each wave packet spreads it is confined to one definite path
through configuration space bounded by these high energy configurations.
Thus the time evolution of the clockwork mechanism follows a continuum of
linear quasi-classical histories whose shapes are governed by a single algo-
rithm embodied in the rigid structure of the mechanism itself.
Now let us imagine a system whose evolution in time depends sensitively
on its initial state. This is the hallmark of “chaotic” behaviour in classical
dynamics. The instantaneous state of such a classical system is still repre-
sented by a point in configuration space and its time evolution represented
by a single curve through that point. Thus, in principle, its behaviour is no
different from that of a non-chaotic classical system. However, in practice,
the difference between the two systems is manifest in the non-predictability
of the chaotic system compared to the regular system, given that its initial
state can only be specified to some finite degree of accuracy. For instance,
one can imagine a pair of identical chaotic systems evolving from slightly
different initial conditions, represented by a pair of closely separated points
in configuration space. The curves representing these two systems diverge
exponentially so that they subsequently behave in a very different manner.
Now we assume that the rules of quantum mechanics should hold for all
physical systems. Thus, in reality, our chaotic system should be represented
as a wave function in configuration space. Again, on interaction with the
environment, this wave function decoheres into a mixture of localized wave
packets each representing a superposition of chaotic systems, whose compo-
nents vary slightly in location, orientation and detailed structure. However,
in contrast to the clockwork mechanism, a chaotic system does not have a
rigid construction so that configurations with significant distortions are not
energetically disfavoured. Thus each wave packet can spread in all directions
unhindered by high energy configurations. These extended wave packets are
decohered by the environment so that the time evolution of the chaotic sys-
tem follows a continuum of divergent branching quasi-classical histories.
Now let us consider Stapp’s stipulation that, in order to describe an ob-
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server’s experiences, one requires a discrete set of orthogonal histories. We
have seen that the time evolution of the clockwork mechanism consists of
a continuum of parallel histories so that such a system does not meet our
requirements. The time evolution of a chaotic system, however, comprises
a continuum of divergent histories that quickly become orthogonal to each
other. Now I contend that each quasi-classical history is, in essence, a record
of a calculation. Thus each history can be represented uniquely by the small-
est program, in a given computer language, that performs that calculation.
In the case of the clockwork mechanism all the histories are described by
the one program embodied in the mechanism’s design. In the case of the
chaotic system, however, there are many qualitatively distinct histories cor-
responding to different programs. Furthermore, since the set of programs
is denumerable, the set of qualitatively distinct histories must be discrete.
Thus a chaotic system seems to meet Stapp’s basic criteria for a quantum-
mechanical observer.
It has been proposed[26] that fundamental aspects of the brain’s function-
ing might well be chaotic in nature. In contrast to a clockwork mechanism,
whose rigid structure precludes any small deviations in its instantaneous
state from affecting its prescribed behaviour, the brain might be “soft” in
the sense that its structure does not provide a barrier against such deviations
magnifying into subsequent large-scale behaviour. In a classical world such
behaviour would not be qualitatively distinct from that of a regular system
as both, in principle, can be simulated to an arbitrary degree of accuracy
by a computer executing a single program[27]. In reality, however, as the
brain is a quantum-mechanical system interacting with its environment, its
time evolution should be represented by an ensemble of continually branch-
ing qualitatively distinct histories, each corresponding to a different program.
Such a set of histories form a branching tree-like structure so that, from the
vantage point of any localized wave packet describing an instantaneous state
of the brain, there are many future paths but only one past. Thus I hypoth-
esize that the current moment of consciousness is simultaneously associated
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with all the quasi-classical histories that go through its corresponding wave
packet.
Now, Tegmark has argued[28] that the decoherence timescale for the brain
must be orders of magnitude less than its dynamical timescale. According to
Clarke’s stability criterion[29], this fact seems to preclude superpositions of
brain states from playing a part in conscious experience. In fact, according
to Joos and Zeh[24], only the long-range phase correlations in a system’s
wave function decohere quickly leaving a mixture of localized Gaussian wave
packets that are stable with respect to further interactions with the environ-
ment. I contend that it is the superposition of microscopically different brain
states represented by a wave packet that survives to become simultaneously
associated with all the decohereing quasi-classical histories that branch from
its region of configuration space.
8 Many-Worlds Resolution of the Doomsday
Argument
The doomsday argument makes the implicit assumption that only one quasi-
classical history will actually exist so that one’s current moment is only
associated with one set of moments with a definite size. In order to avoid
the infinite lifetime paradox, described in Section 5, we must assume that
this set is finite. We have seen that any such history can be simulated by a
classical computer running an appropriate program. Thus if a finite set of
conscious moments is associated with only one history then the program that
simulates that history should also generate the same set of moments. Now, as
discussed in Section 6, given a program that generates a finite set of moments
one can always construct a similar program that, in principle, generates an
infinite set of moments. I contend that the only way to avoid the ensuing
infinite lifetime paradox is to abandon the assumption that a particular quasi-
classical history, or its equivalent program, can generate conscious awareness.
Now this result precludes any interpretation of quantum theory in which
22
exclusive probabilities are assigned to the set of quasi-classical histories. Such
an assignment would imply that only one of the histories actually occurs
which, together with the fact of our consciousness, leads to the paradox
described above. Instead we must assume that our current moment is simul-
taneously associated with many quasi-classical histories. This implies that
our current moment is a member of many sets of moments simultaneously.
Thus, following the many-worlds interpretation[30, 31, 32], we assume that
the rules of quantum theory only provide an ensemble weight for each deco-
herent quasi- classical history. Thus the instantaneous state of the system
comprising one’s brain and its environment determines the ensemble weight
of all the subsequent quasi-classical histories that will be experienced by dif-
ferent versions of oneself. In a sense one’s “free-will” is preserved in that
one has the freedom to do otherwise than one did (in fact a version of you
did do otherwise) but also the ensemble weights of the subsequent actions of
versions of oneself are influenced by one’s “nature” as defined by one’s initial
brain state. Following the spirit of the doomsday argument as metaphysical
reasoning, we do not have the details of the initial system state that would
allow us to calculate the ensemble weights of its subsequent histories. In-
stead we need to assume some “template” weight function, W (N), for the
total weight of histories associated with N conscious moments. We already
have a very natural candidate: the scaleless vague prior function given by
W (N) =
1
N
.
Now let us reconsider the original doomsday argument calculation. By
applying Bayes’s theorem, we found that our posterior probability distribu-
tion, P (N | n), for the set of exclusive hypotheses about the population size
N, is given by the relation
P (N | n) ∝ P (n | N) P (N),
where the distribution P (N) represents our prior probabilities over the set
of hypotheses and P (n | N) is the likelihood of finding ourselves in moment
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n given a particular hypothesis for N. Now the above calculation is only
valid for a set of exclusive hypotheses for N so that P (N) represents a prior
distribution of exclusive probabilities. But, as mentioned previously, in the
many-worlds view each moment is associated with many actually occurring
quasi-classical histories that correspond to different population sizes N. Thus
in this scenario our prior distribution W (N) represents a set of ensemble
weights for each value of N.
Let us assume that each quasi-classical history of the brain is correlated
with a particular finite set of N conscious moments. In doing this we do not
assume that a particular history is sufficient, in itself, to generate that set of
conscious moments but rather that it is a necessary factor. One can use the
principle of indifference to argue that the probability, P (n | N), of finding
oneself at moment n within this set of N conscious moments, is given by
P (n | N) =
1
N
.
Now although each history is associated with only one set of conscious
moments, each moment is associated with many histories and consequently
many sets of moments. In order to calculate the total probability of finding
oneself in any moment, one needs to add the probability contributions from
all the sets that contain that moment. Thus the probability of finding one-
self in moment n, P (n), is given by the sum of all principle of indifference
terms, P (n | N), associated with each history with a particular value of N,
multiplied by the weight function for such histories, W (N), so that we have
P (n) =
∞∑
N=n
P (n | N) W (N).
If we substitute in our expression for the principle of indifference, P (n | N) =
1/N , and our vague prior weight function W (N) = 1/N we find
P (n) =
∞∑
N=n
1
N2
.
By approximating the above sum with an integral we find that
P (n) =
1
n
.
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Now as this probability distribution is the vague prior function again, the
calculation shows that conditionalizing on the assumption that our current
moment is a member of many sets of moments simultaneously does not alter
our initial ignorance about our position, which is also represented by the
vague prior. In other words, on finding ourselves in moment n, rather than
gaining information about the total lifetime N that we will experience, we
instead simply gain the amount of information implicit in the number n
itself, which is never more than log
2
n bits. The only difference between
this many-worlds calculation and the original doomsday calculation is that
the condition of exclusivity between hypotheses for the total population size
has been lifted. It seems that in generalizing Gott’s Copernican principle[6],
namely that one should not expect to be located at a “special” position
within a particular population, to cover the case where one is located within
many versions of the population simultaneously, one finds that it loses its
predictive power.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that this generalized
version of the Copernican principle naturally accommodates an infinite set
of possibilities for the position of one’s current moment while at the same
time avoiding the absurdity inherent in the assumption of an infinite life-
time. This is achieved by hypothesizing that, in principle, one’s current
conscious moment is associated with all the quasi-classical histories that go
through its region of configuration space, each history only being correlated
with consciousness over a finite section of its length. As we only ever apply
the principle of indifference over finite sections of histories then we never
encounter the problem of extending a uniform probability distribution over
an infinite interval. But if we assume, a priori, that all histories exist then
this implies that, for any given finite conscious lifetime N, there is always a
history that is correlated with a finite lifetime larger than N. Thus one can
see that our many-worlds viewpoint, while denying the possibility of an infi-
nite conscious lifetime, refrains from imposing an upper limit to the position
of one’s current moment within a lifetime.
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One could criticize this analysis for being based on the vague prior weight
function. As mentioned previously, this function is only a template for the
actual normalizable weight distribution determined by the initial quantum
state of the system comprising one’s brain and its environment. In fact, one
can argue that the set of actual weight distributions can be divided into two
classes: those with a finite upper bound for N and those without an upper
bound. If the distribution of conscious lifetimes is bounded then this implies
that a quantum simulation of the system as a whole, after running for a finite
amount of time, would produce no more conscious awareness. Now if this
were the case one could, in principle, continually re-run this finite simulation
so as to produce a set of infinite conscious lifetimes. As this possibility
leads to the infinite lifetime paradox again I speculate that the actual weight
distribution of lifetimes associated with any conscious moment cannot have
an upper bound. This result would give credence to an actual “quantum
immortality” of the form described above.
9 Conclusions
The doomsday argument, in its original formulation, uses the principle of
indifference to predict the lifetime of the human race given our position within
it. When applied to the lifetime of a single observer, considered as a sequence
of “moments”, one appreciates that the argument actually depends on the
observer’s conscious awareness. By considering the case of an infinite lifetime
I derive contradictory conditions on the amount of information gained on
“finding” oneself within such an ensemble of moments. I conclude that an
infinite conscious lifetime is not possible, even in principle. This result is, in
fact, an embodiment of the doomsday argument itself.
Now, on the assumption that an observer follows deterministic laws, one
should always be able to simulate him by a classical computer running an
appropriate program. In such a scenario the observer’s consciousness would
be a continually generated by-product of the computer’s operation. But
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given a program that generates a finite set of conscious moments one can,
in principle, always construct a non-terminating program that generates an
infinite set of conscious moments. I contend that, in order to avoid the
ensuing infinite lifetime paradox, one must abandon the assumption that
consciousness can be generated by a single set of deterministic laws.
This result motivates me to consider the many-worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics which, together with the phenomenon of environmental
decoherence, implies that many quasi-classical histories exist, each following
its own set of deterministic laws. Now I propose that the chaotic histories of
the brain, when classified in terms of computation, provide a discrete orthog-
onal basis set of experienced histories. I then hypothesize that one’s current
moment of consciousness is generated by a superposition of microscopically
dissimilar brain states, localized in configuration space, that is simultaneously
associated with many divergent quasi-classical histories leading to different
conscious lifetimes.
Now the doomsday argument implicitly assumes that only one history
will exist so that one’s current moment is only associated with one set of
conscious moments. When one lifts this assumption, by interpreting one’s
prior for the total population size to be an ensemble weight rather than an
exclusive probability, one finds that the doomsday argument fails to make any
prediction about the lifetime that any version of oneself will experience. This
generalized doomsday argument solves Einstein’s problem of representing
the probability of “finding” oneself in infinite time without leading to the
absurdity of zero probability. In doing so it forces us to abandon the notion
of time as an infinite line but instead assume a many-worlds view in which
time has an unbounded tree-like structure, each branch of which supports
consciousness over a finite section of its length.
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